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Abstract
Psychiatric practice is often faced with complex situations that seem to pose serious moral
dilemmas for practitioners. Methods for solving these dilemmas have included the development of
more objective rules to guide the practitioner such as utilitarianism and deontology. A more
modern variant on this objective model has been 'Principlism' where 4 mid level rules are used to
help solve these complex problems. In opposition to this, there has recently been a focus on more
subjective criteria for resolving complex moral dilemmas. In particular, virtue ethics has been
posited as a more sensitive method for helping doctors to reason their way through difficult ethical
issues. Here the focus is on the character traits of the practitioner. Bloch and Green advocated
another way whereby more objective methods such as Principlism and virtue ethics are combined
to produce what they considered sound moral reasoning in psychiatrists. This paper points out
some difficulties with this approach and instead suggests that a better model of ethical judgment
could be developed through the use of narratives or stories. This idea puts equal prima facie value
on the patient's and the psychiatrist's version of the dilemma they are faced with. It has the potential
to lead to a more genuine empathy and reflective decision-making.
Introduction
In professions that have direct contact with people, the
role of humanities in professional education assumes a
particularly important value. Since the vast majority of the
work of health care professionals is with colleagues and
clients, it seems obvious that humanities in general and
ethics in particular should play a large part in both their
education and their clinical practice. Doctors have tradi-
tionally viewed the Hippocratic Oath as an ethical frame-
work in which to practice medicine but as medicine has
become more complex, so has its ethical dilemmas. There
has been a great deal of discussion about whether medi-
cine in general and psychiatry in particular are faced with
such unique circumstances in clinical practice that they
need a unique ethical framework [1]. In a recent, thought-
ful article, Sidney Bloch and Stephen Green not only agree
that psychiatry needs an ethical framework that can cap-
ture the complex moral dilemmas inherent in practice but
they also provide a framework that provides a comple-
mentary model of ethical practice [2]. Their model is
designed to link Principle based ethics with virtue ethics.
This mix or complement of objective rules or Principles
and subjective character traits is, they contend, a method
of practitioners exercising what could be called, 'judgment
within limits'. Principles, according to Bloch and Green,
provide the boundaries or limits in which practitioners
can exercise their judgments. To give justice to the actual
situation or relationship they advocate the use of charac-
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ter based ethics to provide the emotional core or 'heart' to
the ethical decision. Their model is a combination of
mind and heart that tries to complement each other in
attempting to resolve difficult moral dilemmas. While rec-
ognizing problems with both Principlism and virtue eth-
ics per se, Bloch and Green assert that they can, in
combination, provide a sound moral framework 'based
on conceptual compatibility and synergy'. In the next sec-
tion of this paper, we point out some problems, both
methodological and practical, with this position and sug-
gest a way forward.
Ethics: The heart of the problem
Bloch and Green make an important point when they say
that we need to put 'heart' into ethical decision making.
They think that a principle-based approach to ethical deci-
sion making leaves out too much of the personal in deli-
cate situations. They propose an additional or
'complementary' framework which, they say, can make us
more sensitive to the real situation. To illustrate the com-
plexity of clinical situations, they use a clinical scenario
which they call 'Jill, Tim and the baby'. They then explore
various possible ethical solutions to the scenario and find
all the usual methods problematic. Deontological
approaches, they assert, cannot resolve moral conflicts
and so the psychiatrist is 'denied an available remedy'.
Utilitarianism is seen by the authors as too difficult to cal-
culate benefits and risks and demands an impartiality that
clinicians would find difficult to achieve. Both deontol-
ogy, a respect for patient autonomy, and utility, a meas-
urement of consequences, are seen as theories that do not
help clinicians in practice. This is particularly the case in
conflict situations. For example, an older person may
want to stay in her home despite the risk she might pose
to herself and others. Deontology would argue that we
should respect the patient's views while utilitarianism
argues that we should decide the case, based on possible
consequences [3]. Neither theory can resolve a complex
clinical situation such as this as both are in conflict.
The authors then go on to examine the value of Principle-
based ethics as a middle way approach to ethical dilem-
mas. Their problem with this approach is that while it
does provide ethical guidelines, the approach is 'far from
definitive'. Moral reasoning, they contend, based on a
principled approach, 'falls between the poles of subjectiv-
ity and objectivity'. They then turn to virtue ethics as a
possible way of producing good ethical decisions in clini-
cal practice. Virtue ethics, derived from Aristotle, links per-
sons and actions in a virtuous circle. The idea is that a
cultivation of ethical qualities or character traits will lead
clinicians to act ethically in clinical situations. One diffi-
culty which they identify with this approach is that there
is no clear understanding of how these ethical or virtuous
characteristics are developed in people, whether they are
genetically or socially derived. They conclude that virtue
ethics, by itself, 'cannot.....guide clinicians to deal with the
moral complexity facing them'. In their search for a possi-
ble way of resolving difficult ethical cases, they finally turn
to a variation on virtue ethics, the ethics of care. Here, they
assert, emotions have a part to play in moral reasoning.
However, they find that too much reliance on emotions
will just produce subjective judgments that undercut any
attempt to produce 'reasoned ethical debate' and will
instead produce a relativism, in which everyone is equally
right. In summary they find that all single approaches to
the development of sound ethical reasoning in complex
clinical situations are problematic. They propose instead,
a potential remedy to this problem.
They see the work of Annette Baier as part of a possible
way of developing sound moral reasoning in clinical situ-
ations. Baier, they suggest, sees contributing to 'a climate
of trust' as a primary responsibility for clinicians, particu-
larly psychiatrists, in clinical situations. Promoting trust
between clients and clinicians, they argue, is at the heart
of all clinical situations. However, they also argue that this
should be complemented by 'a more structured frame-
work', namely, Principlism. This mix of guiding principles
and a context of trust, they argue, will provide clinicians
with the opportunity to examine 'the ethical nuts and
bolts' of clinical situations through sound moral reason-
ing. While this provides a more sensitive approach to
complex clinical encounters, it has its own difficulties
The scenario and the narrative
If we go back to Bloch and Green's scenario, we can per-
haps see the problem. A consultant psychiatrist, Dr Jones,
has to choose between enforced treatment for a woman
who does not see the need for her to have any medical
care. The authors explore this scenario with their new
complementary model. They show that a climate of trust
must first be built up, using a character-based approach,
to extend care to the family. This can enhance Dr Jones'
empathy and understanding of the family but it is not
enough to approach the 'level of clarity required to reach
reasoned moral judgments'. Here the four principles can
be used to structure the moral deliberations that Dr Jones
will make. Bloch and Green explore the scenario using
these principles and conclude that Dr Jones may have to
act paternalistically and treat the woman. Although, they
acknowledge that whatever intervention is finally decided
on by Dr Jones, there will be a degree of uncertainty in
outcome, they assert that they have provided a 'means to
reflect iteratively on what constitutes the most apt ethical
action'. We would agree, with Bloch and Green that out-
comes are not necessarily everything, but we do have
problems with their approach.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:7 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/7
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The first difficulty is that while Bloch and Green criticize
others for developing ethical methods rather than theories,
they do the same thing. The paper is called 'An ethical
framework for psychiatry' but it is, in practice, a method
or procedure. It lays out a series of procedural steps for
exploring ethical dilemmas but it does not ask itself about
the 'ethical dilemma' itself. This is because the iterative
process is carried out by the doctor without really hearing
from the woman. Part of the reason for this is that the doc-
tor implicitly relegates her views or story, as she is 'dis-
turbed'. The scenario is already paternalistic before any
further exploration is carried out; this doctor already
'understands'. The procedure he then adopts only con-
firms him in his paternalism. If it was really a critically
reflective process, the doctor could see that. Our problem
with Bloch and Green's framework is that it is not reflec-
tive enough and could simply confirm a psychiatrist's
original impressions and outlook. We do not hear from
Jill or Tim, only from the doctor.
Barons's work demonstrates that doctors may be dis-
tracted from seriously listening to clients by their need to
follow the structured 'listening' inherent in the medical
model itself [4]. This kind of listening is a kind of detec-
tive model in which client's narratives are re-structured
within assumptions and theories that professionals bring
to the clinical encounter. As previously mentioned, a
recent paper makes the point that psychiatric nurses fit
what they hear from clients into their therapeutic contexts
[5]. A family doctor, for example, may 'hear' a client's
complaint about a headache as a 'neurological distur-
bance'. Both participants in the conversation may, in prac-
tice, be talking about different things. Clients' narratives
might be automatically fitted into diagnostic criteria, as
Bloch and Green do in their example, where the client is
already 'delusional'. So although most doctors would
claim that they really do listen to their clients, we suspect
that this listening is already pre-judged, Bloch and Green's
ethical framework could be seen as another professional
model of judgment that simply fits clients' points of view
into something prepared earlier. Our version of active lis-
tening is an appeal for more genuine openness and empa-
thy from doctors.
While Bloch and Green do make a sincere attempt to
empathize with Jill and Tim, it is a little difficult to vali-
date this since we do not know what their empathy would
look like. It might be convincing the couple that the doc-
tor really does have the couple's best interests at heart but
Jill and Tim cannot even say this. This is the heart of the
matter. Bloch and Green want the patient or client to trust
them that they have their best interests at heart as they
have a procedure for thinking about these complex ethical
situations. What might help us to trust them is if the doc-
tor allowed us to hear from Jill and Tim. They, perhaps,
would see things differently. Bloch and Green ask the
same of their readers as they do of their clients: trust me,
I'm a doctor. However, they don't really give us or their cli-
ents a reason for doing so. This is a problem with case
studies and clinical scenarios that has already been dis-
cussed by the first author [6]. If we are going to explore
complex ethical situations, we have to see the people
involved and hear their story. The clinical scenario tells us
about the doctor and his story. It does not allow the doc-
tor to reflect on his story and the other possible stories
that Jill and Tim may have told. They may have contra-
dicted or confirmed the story, but we shall never know; we
are required to trust the doctor. While Bloch and Green
claim that their model provides clinicians with a 'means
to reflect iteratively on what constitutes the most apt eth-
ical action', there is no real iterative process, just the doc-
tor talking to himself.
Other persons, other stories
What seems to be missing from Bloch and Green's model
is any real sense that there may be other stories to tell and
other stories to hear. In their model, the doctor sees both
sides and makes ethical decisions weighing up 'both
sides'. As has already been pointed out, this is not an
authentic 'other' side, simply the doctor imagining it.
However, in all professional/client encounters there are
always two sides to everything. Given this, we need to
think that a doctor could be wrong in a more fundamental
way than Bloch and Green imagine. It is not simply a mat-
ter of doctors making the wrong ethical decision; this is
always a possibility. Bloch and Green try to provide a pro-
cedure for minimizing these mistakes. But we are equally
not arguing merely for standardized best practice. Whilst
standardized best practice is laudable in itself, our criti-
cism is not a criticism of poor practice. It is a much more
fundamental criticism of the way ethical decisions are
being made in a prescribed process-driven manner.
The deeper problem for Bloch and Green's ethical model
is that the doctor could be seeing the situation wrongly. In
their scenario, the doctor tests his view of the situation
against his view of how the woman sees it. What seems to
get in the way is the doctor's sense that his client(s) is
mentally disturbed and this will, we believe, lead to an
'instinct to mistrust' the client. Whilst skepticism in the
validity of the patient's story may be justified in many
cases, in will not be justified in some. However, it will not
be true in every case. In a recent book, one of the authors
pointed out this problem for mental health nurses who
base their practices on the assumption that all their clients
need therapy [5]. In this kind of 'procedural' practice, the
focus is on what kind of therapy rather than on the initial
issue of whether clients need therapy in the first place.
Bloch and Green are caught up in this procedural debate
assuming that their view of the situation is the only wayPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:7 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/7
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to see things. In this model there is no empathic relation-
ship between doctor and client.
If psychiatrists are going to practice ethically, they have to
begin with the assumption that their clients have an
equally valid point of view to the doctor's and have to be
prepared to be wrong in their view of the situation. This
goes far beyond standardized current best practice. It is
not enough for the psychiatrist to have a set of Principles
and a virtuous character, though these are useful
attributes. Ethical psychiatry is more about initially
according equal weight to the possibility that the client
might have a story to tell. Here Ross's notion of parallel
truths can be helpful [7]. Ross wants to show that people
operate with different parallel truths, which they use to
interpret the world and situations they find themselves in.
In practice, this means that psychiatrists and clients can
potentially operate within different moral universes and
'forms of life' [8]. If we are going to develop a truly ethical
psychiatry, it cannot be one where the psychiatrist does all
the imagining and evaluating, in other words: being judge
and jury in one person. Ross points us to the fact that peo-
ple see things differently but from equally valid points of
view. If we are to take this seriously we need to develop a
clinical method that values this notion of 'parallel truths'
as a beginning for any clinical encounter.
What is needed is a way of engaging both psychiatrists and
clients in conversations where there is an assumption that
both have equally valid stories to tell. This is in keeping
with our assumption that there is no absolute truth and
no absolutely right or wrong decision when it comes to
ethical dilemmas. This conversational model gives equal
initial weight to all narratives, both psychiatrist's and cli-
ent's.
Ethical psychiatry and ethical conversations
We have a problem with the notion of psychiatric ethics.
Instead, we prefer the term 'ethical psychiatry'. Psychiatry
is about helping people who suffer from mental illness.
Here, the ethic of helping people comes first. This ethic is
the foundation of psychiatric practice. Although this is a
banal truism, it is often overlooked in everyday practice.
This is because practicing psychiatrists often see their eve-
ryday practice as 'problem solving'. However, solving
problems is not the same thing as helping people. In
many ways, psychiatrists work much more closely with
their clients than other clinicians. They are often faced
with a complex mix of technical, social and personal
problems. This is in contrast to more 'technical' clinical
practices such as surgery and so on. After all, it is unlikely
that clients have strong views about particular surgical
techniques. Given this, it is even more important that psy-
chiatrists develop a genuinely iterative process in working
with clients. We suggest a particular conversational frame-
work that might help psychiatry to practice in a more eth-
ically reflective way.
Charles Taylor points out:
When we see something surprising, or something that dis-
concerts us, or which we can't quite see, we normally react
by setting ourselves to look more closely: we alter our
stance, perhaps rub our eyes, concentrate, and the like [9].
This is something that we all do from time to time. We
sometimes see something that disrupts our normal per-
ceptions. Here we question our first impressions. The
process involves us moving around, checking our equip-
ment, getting more focused and so on. In a similar way
our conversational framework allows different percep-
tions or views of the situation to question each other. In
clinical practice, the medical staff's view of the situation or
problem could be questioned by the client's alternative
story. Many doctors would want to argue that they do
allow their clients' views to influence their clinical judg-
ments. We would certainly agree with that. However, the
point we are making is slightly different: The notion of
parallel truths provides firmer ground for conversations
between doctors and clients. It enables the doctors to take
seriously the client's story rather than automatically deval-
uing it with their own story. We are not suggesting that
psychiatrists and other doctors have not a good story to
tell; we are simply arguing that the client may have an
equally good one. If we assume this, we need to develop
ways of seriously engaging with this. In many situations,
the doctor's view of the situation will prevail; but not
always. Our conversational model assumes an initial
validity for each story. This allows the practitioner's view
of the situation to be explicitly challenged by the client's.
By listening seriously to the client's story, it allows the cli-
nician to get closer to the client as a person. It allows the
clinician to engage in 'disciplined empathy' with the cli-
ent. Disciplined empathy is about seriously and reflectively
listening to the client's story.
The client's story provides an opportunity and a context
for genuine empathy between professional and client.
Empathy, on Bloch and Green's model is about the doctor
doing all of the work by imagining things from the client's
point of view. Seriously listening to the client's story gives
the doctor a real insight into the client's life context and
thus frames and disciplines his or her response. It pro-
vides a context for the doctor's deliberations and ongoing
conversations with the client. It also provides an opportu-
nity for clinicians to reflect on their own practice by seeing
it from the client's point of view and could help in the
development of clinical skills and ethical competence.
Just knowing ethical theories will not necessarily make a
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ethical competence, treating patients' stories as of equal
validity, will allow practitioners to gain a stronger degree
of empathy with their clients life and provide valuable
insights into their own practice.
Conclusion
In Bloch and Green's scenario, using narratives and paral-
lel truths would have allowed Dr Jones to reflect on Jill
and Tim's story. Valuing those stories as equal would have
helped to create empathy that allowed better reconcilia-
tion between Jill's views and the available treatment
options. It would have avoided a cognitive framework
which forced Dr Jones into looking at Jill's point of view
entirely through the eye of an illness model, as well
intended as this may have been.
In this paper, we have tried to suggest a more ethically
aware framework for psychiatric practice in particular and
medicine in general. The framework is designed to be sen-
sitive to each clinical encounter by enabling doctors to
engage with their clients in serious conversations where
each point of view or narrative is seen as equally valid.
Underpinning this framework is the ethic of helping peo-
ple. While not prescriptive, this ethic can help to evaluate
these narratives. The ethic becomes part of the conversa-
tion as it provides a standard or measure in judging each
narrative. Judgments in clinical practice are a matter of
reconciling available treatment options with individual
clients. This narrative based conversation can help doctors
make more ethically conscious judgments by getting them
to see their initial impressions from a different perspec-
tive. It provides a reflective opportunity for a clinician to
examine his or her own practice
We are not suggesting that ethical psychiatry or medicine
is about clinicians giving up responsibility for their judg-
ments in practice. We would imagine that in the majority
of cases, clinicians' experiences would be the deciding fac-
tor. However, our framework for the practice of a genu-
inely ethical psychiatry assumes that the clinician's
experience may not always be the deciding factor. A clini-
cian, using our framework, is open to this possibility. We
do not provide any answers to particular situations but we
suggest that a genuinely ethical psychiatry and medicine
should begin with this assumption. By listening to a cli-
ent's story, a clinician may gain some insight into the per-
son behind the client role and that would really be about
helping people. Narratives and story-telling are some-
thing that we can all engage in. They emphasize the key
role that the humanities in particular can play in the edu-
cation of psychiatrists, doctors and health care profession-
als.
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